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THE POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 In the essay “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” Dr. Richard Feldman examines 
reasonable disagreements between peers.1  More specifically, he asks whether such 
disagreements are possible, and also whether the parties to such a disagreement could think that 
both their own belief and the belief of their peer with whom they disagree are reasonable.  
Feldman argues that there cannot be any such thing as a reasonable disagreement, and 
furthermore, that the parties to a disagreement are not epistemically licensed to think that their 
own belief and their opponents belief are both reasonable.  As Feldman notes, “open and honest 
discussion seems to have the puzzling effect of making reasonable disagreement impossible”.2 
My project herein will be (in §2) to explain Feldman’s notion of a reasonable 
disagreement, and then reconstruct and assess his argumentation, and (in §3) advance three 
objections to Feldman’s argument.  I will focus on denying Feldman’s answer to his first 
question—that reasonable disagreement between peers is not possible—and my suggestion is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Although	  Feldman	  focuses	  in	  particular	  on	  religious	  disagreement,	  his	  account	  extends	  to	  other	  realms	  of	  
disagreement.	  	  So,	  I	  won’t	  restrict	  my	  discussion	  of	  this	  topic	  to	  only	  religious	  disagreement.	  
2	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  145;	  my	  emphasis.	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that if any of these three objections to Feldman’s argument go through, then the argument falls.  
And if Feldman’s argument falls, then his argument no longer provides grounds for our thinking 
that reasonable disagreement is impossible. 
 
2.   Feldman’s Account of Reasonable Disagreement3 
2.1   Merely Apparent vs. Genuine Disagreement 
 Right away, Feldman excludes from the domain of interest so-called “merely apparent 
and not genuine” disagreements.4  To that end, Feldman suggests the following four varieties of 
disagreements count as “merely apparent”: (i) disagreements which are not the result of 
disputants holding incompatible attitudes toward a single proposition (or some member of a set 
of exclusive propositions); (ii) disagreements arising from the fact that particular English words 
have more than one conventional meaning; (iii) disagreements arising through incompatible 
activities or lifestyles; and (iv) disagreements arising between people whose perspectives 
radically disagree due to their different locations in space or time (consider Feldman’s ‘Ancient 
flat-Earthers’ example).  Excluding items (i)-(iv) is intended to narrow the scope of enquiry to 
only the “genuine” disagreements. 
 2.2   Clarifying the Questions & Terminology 
So what, exactly, does Feldman think the relevant cases for analysis are in a discussion of 
disagreement?  To begin with, a more precise articulation of Feldman’s questions is in order.  In 
his essay, he formulates his questions as follows: 
 Q1: Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence have reasonable disagreements? 
 Q2: Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Due	  to	  limitations	  in	  length,	  this	  paper’s	  reconstruction	  of	  Feldman’s	  account	  is	  briefer	  than	  I’d	  like.	  	  However,	  I	  
believe	  that	  the	  most	  salient	  points	  to	  both	  his	  project	  and	  mine	  are	  elucidated	  herein.	  
4	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  142.	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        belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also reasonable?5 
 
Some clarification of terminology will aid our understanding of Feldman’s questions, and thus 
our understanding of what sorts of disagreements he has in mind.  When Feldman says epistemic 
peers, he refers to people that are “roughly equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, 
background information, etc.”  And when Feldman says peers have shared their evidence, this 
means they have “had a full discussion of a topic and have not withheld relevant information”.   
Furthermore, Feldman understands a disagreement (simpliciter) to be that which exists between 
two people “when one believes a proposition and the other denies (i.e., disbelieves) that 
proposition.”  And a reasonable disagreement exists between two people “when they have a 
disagreement and each is reasonable (or justified) in his or her belief.”  Finally, Feldman says a 
belief is reasonable “when it has adequate evidential support.”6  This is to distinguish the 
evidential or epistemic reasonable-ness of a belief from other varieties of reasonable-ness (e.g., 
prudential or practical).   
With these terminological clarifications in hand and Feldman’s paring of cases, we can 
now understand Q1 as asking whether two people of roughly similar cognitive endowment and 
who have shared all of their (relevant) information can disagree about the truth of some 
proposition, and each be justified in their respective stance toward that proposition.7  And that is 
what Feldman thinks is the relevant sort of case to be analyzed in our discussion of disagreement.  
Further, Feldman believes that thorough considerations of such cases cannot lead to affirmative 
answers to Q1 and Q2. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Ibid,	  p.	  144.	  
6	  Ibid;	  all	  of	  the	  foregoing	  terms	  are	  defined	  on	  pp.	  144-­‐5.	  
7	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  introduction,	  I	  will	  concern	  myself	  primarily	  with	  Feldman’s	  Q1.	  	  Thus,	  I	  will	  not—and	  have	  no	  
need	  to—elaborate	  on	  Q2	  here.	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 2.3   The Uniqueness Thesis 
 Upon clarifying terms and winnowing the field of enquiry, Feldman then posits a crucial 
component in his account: the ‘Uniqueness Thesis’.  Feldman formulates the Uniqueness Thesis 
(UT) as follows: 
 UT: A body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of 
        propositions (e.g., one theory out of a bunch of exclusive alternatives) and that it 
        justifies at most one attitude toward any particular proposition.8 
 
The exclusivity of the members within the competing set of propositions just means that the truth 
of one proposition implies the falsity of its competitors.  And the relevant attitudes that the body 
of evidence can justify are constrained to believing, disbelieving, and suspending judgment.9 
 Feldman motivates (but does not argue for) UT by providing a thought experiment about 
a detective with equally strong evidence for the guilt of two different criminals (named Lefty & 
Righty), who also knows that only one of the criminals is actually guilty.  At first, this case 
appears to be one in which the detective could reasonably believe that Lefty is guilty and also 
reasonably believe that Righty is guilty.  And if instead of just one there were two detectives, D1 
& D2, each in possession of the exact same body of evidence, then D1 & D2 could each hold one 
of the two beliefs formerly held by the single detective.  So, D1 could reasonably believe that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  148.	  
9	  Although	  Feldman	  restricts	  the	  possible	  attitudes	  one	  might	  have	  toward	  some	  proposition,	  p,	  it	  nevertheless	  
could	  be	  that	  there	  are	  other	  attitudes	  to	  hold	  with	  respect	  to	  p.	  	  For	  instance	  faith	  might	  be	  one	  of	  these.	  	  As	  Dan	  
Howard-­‐Snyder	  puts	  it	  “A	  wife	  might	  have	  faith	  that	  her	  marriage	  will	  survive	  a	  crisis	  while	  harboring	  doubts	  about	  
it.	  Indeed,	  propositional	  faith	  is	  precisely	  that	  attitude	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  she	  might	  possess	  the	  inner	  stability	  and	  
impetus	  that	  enables	  her	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  that	  state	  of	  affairs,	  despite	  her	  lack	  of	  certainty.”	  
(Howard-­‐Snyder,	  2013,	  Propositional	  Faith:	  What	  It	  Is	  And	  What	  It	  Is	  Not,	  p.	  3).	  	  I’m	  not	  entirely	  certain	  what	  to	  
make	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  faith	  and	  a	  body	  of	  evidence.	  	  But	  the	  way	  Feldman	  formulates	  the	  Uniqueness	  
Thesis	  and	  defines	  ‘reasonable’	  seems	  prima	  facie	  to	  concern	  itself	  only	  with	  attitudes	  that	  are	  justified	  given	  the	  
evidence,	  and	  to	  exclude	  anything	  else.	  
[5	  of	  12]	  
	  
Lefty is guilty, while D2 could reasonably believe that Righty is guilty.  And in this case, each 
would be justified in their belief, their beliefs would be contrary, and so this would be a 
paradigm case of a reasonable disagreement.   
But upon closer inspection of this case, Feldman says that the “evidence for Righty is 
evidence against Lefty” being guilty, and so—since this is a sort of zero-sum game—if Righty is 
guilty Lefty is not (and vice-versa).  Thus, rather than the detectives each being justified in their 
beliefs, neither of their beliefs have adequate evidential support, and in that case the 
epistemically responsible thing to do would be for D1 and D2 to suspend judgment.  Feldman 
concludes from this thought experiment that “Thinking about the case of Lefty and Righty 
suggests that one cannot reasonably choose belief or disbelief in a case like this,” and that 
“reflection on the case of Lefty and Righty lends strong support to The Uniqueness Thesis.”10 
 
 2.4   Feldman’s Argument 
The foregoing reconstruction of Feldman’s thinking should leave us situated to understand the 
argument for his negative answers to Q1 and Q2.  His argument can be formulated  
something like the following: 
 Feldman’s Argument Against Reasonable Disagreement11 
1.) If the Uniqueness Thesis is correct, then for any two F-Disputants, A & B, and some 
proposition, p, A & B cannot reasonably disagree (w/ each other) regarding the truth of p. 
2.) The Uniqueness Thesis is correct. 
3.) [So] For any two F-Disputants, A & B, and some proposition, p, A & B cannot 
reasonably disagree (w/ each other) regarding the truth of p. 
4.) If (2) & (3), then if A & B cannot reasonably agree regarding the truth of p, then reason 
requires that both A & B must suspend judgment.   
5.) ∴ For any two F-Disputants, A & B, and some proposition, p, if A & B cannot 
reasonably agree regarding the truth of p, then reason requires that both A & B must 
suspend judgment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Quotes	  from	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  148.	  
11	  Feldman	  does	  not	  himself	  provide	  a	  formalized	  argument	  for	  his	  position.	  	  I	  believe	  this	  to	  be	  a	  charitable	  
interpretation	  of	  Feldman’s	  argument.	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Premise (1) comes straight out of his discussion of the ‘Lefty & Righty’ case, and something 
very much like (1) is explicitly stated in the text.12  Additionally, I use the term ‘F-Disputants’ 
(short for ‘Feldmanian Disputants’) to capture Feldman’s conditions that persons A & B must be 
both epistemic peers and have shared all their evidence relevant to a proposition, p.13  Premise (2) 
appeals to Feldman’s thoughts quoted at the end of the previous section (i.e., “reflection on the 
case of Lefty and Righty lends strong support to The Uniqueness Thesis.”).  Premise (3)—also a 
sub-conclusion—amounts to Feldman’s response to Q1; that no, two peers cannot have a 
reasonable disagreement.  Premise (4) simply says that if (3) is correct and that the Uniqueness 
Thesis is correct—particularly that the relevant attitudes that the body of evidence can justify are 
constrained to believing, disbelieving, and suspending judgment—then of course the disputants 
must agree to suspend judgment.  And that is precisely what the argument concludes, which 
amounts to Feldman’s modest skeptical alternative, and his negative response to Q2.  For if the 
two F-disputants must suspend their judgment, then they will not have differing positions, and 
thus will not be able to fulfill the conditions of which Q2 enquires. 
 
3.   Some Objections to Feldman’s Argument Against Reasonable Disagreement 
 3.1   Objection #1—Sharing Evidence Isn’t Enough 
 The first objection to register is against Premise (1) of Feldman’s argument, and has to do 
with the notion of sharing evidence.  Suppose that I have had some sort of unprecedented, 
overwhelming, and life-altering religious experience (LRE), and further suppose that this, along 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  142,	  2nd	  full	  ¶.	  
13	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘F-­‐Disputant’	  here,	  rather	  than	  my	  earlier	  term	  ‘Ideal	  Disputant’,	  because	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  gap	  
between	  what	  Feldman	  requires	  for	  two	  individuals	  to	  be	  party	  to	  a	  genuine	  disagreement,	  and	  what	  one	  might	  
construe	  as	  an	  ‘Ideal	  disputant’;	  namely,	  that	  ‘Ideal	  Disputants’	  would	  be	  something	  like	  “intellectual	  
dopplegangers”—something	  considerably	  stronger	  than	  what	  Feldman	  stipulates.	  	  Credit	  goes	  to	  Dr.	  Dan	  Howard-­‐
Snyder	  for	  bringing	  this	  to	  my	  attention.	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with my other beliefs, provides the grounds for my believing the truth of the following 
proposition, p: 
p: A God exists.   
Now suppose that I run into Uncle Joe (an epistemic peer), and relate to him my belief that p.  
Upon hearing this, Uncle Joe relates to me his dis-belief that p.  So we disagree.  We then engage 
in a thorough discussion wherein we share all of our evidence relevant to our attitude toward p.  
During the course of the conversation I explain to Uncle Joe my LRE, and how this bit of 
evidence figures prominently in my reasons for believing that p.  Then, Uncle Joe tells me of his 
observation of what he takes to be incalculable, unjustifiable, and widespread human pain and 
suffering in the world, and that this observation figures prominently into his reasons for dis-
believing that p.  So, my suggestion is that if I have some such piece of private evidence (to use 
Feldman’s terminology) as my LRE and uncle Joe does not (or has some private evidence that 
contradicts my private evidence), then I have something that justifies my attitude, and Uncle Joe 
has something that justifies his attitude, even after sharing.  And if that’s the case, then it turns 
out we can engage in a reasonable disagreement after all, and premise (1) falls. 
 Anticipating something like this objection, Feldman has a response.  He appeals to a 
thought experiment wherein an epistemic peer and I look out the office window into the quad 
and privately form contradictory beliefs about the presence of the Dean in the quad.  I then tell 
my peer that I see the Dean in the Quad, and my peer responds by telling me that he sees that the 
quad is empty; that the Dean is not in the quad.  Feldman—who says that this example of sightful 
disagreement is analogous to insightful (read personal evidence related) disagreement—draws 
two conclusions.  First, in either the sightful or insightful case described, the only reasonable 
thing to do would be for both parties to suspend judgment.  Second that even if, say, Uncle Joe 
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and I have conflicting private evidence (my experience vs. his observation), because we shared 
our evidence, we informed each other of our respective private evidences.  And this, says 
Feldman, should level the evidential playing-field, because “evidence of evidence is evidence”.14  
In other words, just because I don’t have Uncle Joe’s intuition or related observations, and he 
doesn’t have my LRE doesn’t entail that we can’t hold them as evidence; that is, once Uncle Joe 
and I verbally relate these facts to each other, we obtain evidence of evidence, which is, 
according to Feldman, evidence. 
 Here are my responses to Feldman’s ‘Dean in the Quad’ example.  First, I think that 
Feldman’s analogy is a poor one.  It is disanalogous to the case of my LRE, because whereas my 
epistemic peer and I both have the same sort of physical & perceptual access to the Dean were 
we to walk down to the quad and investigate, no such equivalent access exists for my LRE; 
Uncle Joe can’t walk over to the object of my LRE and touch or feel it, and he certainly doesn’t 
recall or experience it the way I have.  So, Feldman’s analogy is inapplicable insofar as it ignores 
this salient difference. 
 Second, merely verbally relating my LRE to Uncle Joe does not convey the entirety of 
the “evidential force” it has provided for me.  Evidence of evidence might be evidence, but it is 
certainly not any more compelling than is reading an account of a bear attack, rather than being 
the victim of a bear attack; my LRE outstrips its narrative counter-part.  David Hume captured 
this important difference very well in the following passage: 
“All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall 
call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and 
liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or 
consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name 
impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they 
make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and 
reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse…”15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Ibid,	  p.	  151;	  my	  emphasis.	  
15	  Hume	  (1738),	  p.	  1;	  my	  emphasis.	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So, using Hume’s lingo, my life-altering religious experience has a sort of vividness and force 
that is distinctly absent in the idea that my peer has when I relate this experience to them in 
speech or in writing.  And lacking such vividness and force, it simply isn’t as compelling a bit of 
evidence for my peer as it is for me.  This brings us to the next objection. 
 3.2   Objection #2—Privileging Private/Internal Evidence 
 Feldman does not agree that private evidence or inner perceptions should carry more 
evidential weight than a verbal account of them.  On this notion he says  
“…each knows about the other’s insight.  Each knows that this insight has evidential force.  And 
now I see no basis for either of them justifying his own belief simply because the one insight 
happens to occur inside of him.”16  
 
My response to this—and the second objection to premise (1)—is that we do have a reason to 
justify our beliefs, but based not simply on personal insight (the sharing of which doesn’t 
produce a similar attitude in our peer; see §3.1), but also based on the incommunicable, 
phenomenal qualia that are at least partially constitutive of or accompany our own experiences or 
insights.17  In other words, it is precisely because of that compelling vividness, or “force and 
violence” that Hume was on about.  And if this incommunicable, phenomenal qualia or vividness 
of experience—despite our verbally relating that experience—has more evidential force or 
weight for us than for our peer, then we might find ourselves believing proposition p, while our 
peer, having only the “faint image” formed from a verbal or written description of our LRE, is 
not so justified, and thus might dis-believe that p.18  And in that case, we have shared evidence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Feldman	  in	  Goldman	  &	  Whitcomb	  (2011),	  p.	  151;	  my	  emphasis.	  
17	  Credit	  is	  due	  to	  J.	  Rosenbaum,	  E.	  Beszhak,	  T.	  Le,	  &	  B.	  Holz	  for	  conversations	  wherein	  this	  objection	  was	  inspired.	  
18	  Another	  way	  to	  motivate	  this	  idea	  would	  be	  to	  consider	  providing	  a	  blind	  individual	  an	  exhaustive	  verbal	  account	  
of	  my	  experience	  of	  being-­‐presented-­‐to-­‐purplely.	  	  No	  matter	  the	  completeness	  of	  my	  verbal	  account,	  there	  will	  
nevertheless	  be	  some	  compelling,	  phenomenal	  aspect	  that	  is	  markedly	  absent	  in	  such	  an	  account.	  	  And	  so,	  the	  
blind	  person	  cannot	  understand	  the	  totality	  of	  my	  experience—the	  experience	  of	  being-­‐presented-­‐to-­‐purplely—
despite	  my	  giving	  an	  exhaustive	  verbal	  account	  of	  it;	  they	  need	  to	  “see	  for	  themselves”,	  so	  to	  speak.	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amongst epistemic peers (in the Feldmanian sense), and yet we disagree.  So, here again we 
would have a case of reasonable disagreement. 
 Another reason to believe that our inner states should be privileged, is that in the essay 
“Internalism Defended,” Feldman asserts the following: “The justificatory status of a person’s 
doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person’s occurrent and dispositional mental 
states, events, and conditions,” and that, “being epistemically justified in certain attitudes, or 
having attitudes with certain contents [ is] settled by what goes on inside cognitive beings.”19 20  
The point I am trying to drive home here, is that my religious experience is something that 
occurred within me, that the memories and influence of this experience reside in me, and that no 
amount of communication can furnish my epistemic peers with the totality of my internal 
cognitive content.  At best, I can furnish them with a “faint image”.  And this may well fail to be 
as justificatorially compelling for my peer as the original experience was for me.  If so, 
Feldman’s account is in trouble. 
 3.3   Objection #3—Applying the Uniqueness Thesis to Itself 
 The final objection I will advance is aimed at premise (2) of Feldman’s argument.  The 
objection goes something like this.21  Say I have read some convincing philosophical essay, the 
outcome of which is that I now harbor the belief that UT is false.  Later, I engage in a discussion 
with John about the merits of UT, and John asserts that he believes UT to be true.  Now, John 
and I are epistemic peers, and have engaged in a thorough discussion sharing all of our evidence, 
but nevertheless, our respective positions are unchanged.  According to UT, the epistemically 
responsible thing to do would be for both of us to suspend our judgments; that is, suspend our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Conee	  &	  Feldman	  (2001),	  p.	  2;	  my	  emphasis.	  
20	  Ibid,	  p.	  3;	  my	  emphasis.	  
21	  This	  objection	  was	  inspired	  Lynne	  Baker’s	  paper	  (see	  ‘References’	  page),	  wherein	  she	  raises	  a	  similar	  objection	  to	  
UT	  on	  p.	  142.	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judgment about whether or not UT is true or false.  But in that case—if we have no reasonable 
grounds to say it is either true or false—we assign no truth value to UT.  And in that case, 
premise (2) of Feldman’s argument doesn’t hold, and so neither does the conclusion.  Thus, we 
would both have a case of reasonable disagreement, and Feldman’s argument would fail to 
establish the impossibility of such a disagreement. 
 
§4.   Conclusion 
 Dr. Richard Feldman has asserted in his essay “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” 
that it is impossible for Feldmanian disputants to have a reasonable disagreement, and 
furthermore, that the parties to a disagreement are not epistemically licensed to think that both 
their own belief and their opponent’s belief are reasonable.  My goal throughout this paper has 
been to first recount Feldman’s account, and secondly, to raise objections to his argument against 
reasonable disagreement.  Furthermore, I have suggested that if any of the three objections raised 
against his argument go through, then the entire argument falls, and thus fails to establish the 
impossibility of such disagreements.  And in that case, we have defended the notion that in 
certain cases, reasonable disagreement is not impossible.  You, of course, are free to disagree. 
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